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Abstract 
This study proposes a framework for examining the effects of retaking tests in operational 
selection settings. A central feature of this framework is the distinction between within-
person and between-person retest effects. This framework is used to develop hypotheses 
about retest effects for exemplars of three types of tests (knowledge tests, cognitive ability 
tests, and situational judgment tests) and to test these hypotheses in a high stakes selection 
setting (admission to medical studies in Belgium). Analyses of within-person retest effects 
showed that mean scores of repeat test-takers were one third of a standard deviation higher 
for the knowledge test and situational judgment test and one half of a standard deviation 
higher for the cognitive ability test. The validity coefficients for the knowledge test differed 
significantly depending on whether examinees’ test scores on the first versus second 
administration were used, with the latter being more valid. Analyses of between-person 
retest effects on the prediction of academic performance showed that the same test score 
led to higher levels of performance for those passing on the first attempt than for those 
passing on the second attempt. The implications of these results are discussed in light of 
extant retesting practice. 
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Retest Effects in Operational Selection Settings: Development and Test of a Framework 
 In employment settings, the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures 
(1978) state that organizations should provide a reasonable opportunity to test-takers for 
retesting. Hence, most organizations in the private and public sector have installed retesting 
policies in promotion and hiring situations (e.g., Campbell, 2004; McElreath, Bayless, Reilly, 
& Hayes, 2004). In the educational domain, the Standards for Educational and Psychological 
Testing (APA/AERA/NCME, 1999) state that retest opportunities should be provided for tests 
used for promotion or graduation decisions. The opportunity for retesting is also mandated 
for tests used in making admission, licensing, or certification decisions.  
 There appear to be at least two broad rationales behind endorsing retesting. The first 
is that retesting is warranted due to the possibility that the initial assessment was an error, 
either due to a transient characteristic of the applicant at the time of testing (e.g., illness, 
disability), to a transient characteristic of the testing situation (e.g., deviations from 
standardized test administration procedures), or to random measurement error. The second 
is the possibility that candidates have improved their standing on the construct of interest 
during the interval between two administrations. 
 To date, empirical research on retesting in operational selection settings is very 
scarce. Almost all studies have examined retest effects in laboratory settings. In these 
experimental designs, subjects took a practice test (parallel or identical to a criterion test) 
under standardized conditions before being given the criterion test shortly thereafter (Kulik, 
Kulik, & Bangert, 1984). The type of test under study was virtually always a cognitive ability 
test. A key limitation of these laboratory studies is that they do not address questions that 
organizations are likely to face in operational selection contexts. For example, which 
statistical approaches can organizations use for examining retest effects in operational 
selection situations? What is the size of retest effects for tests other than cognitive ability? 
Do test scores of repeat test-takers lead to the same level of performance as test scores of 
one-time test-takers? On a more fundamental level, retesting involves various within-person 
(i.e., a comparison of scores of the same person taking the same test multiple times) and 
Retest effects 4
between-person (i.e., a comparison of scores of one-time test-takers with those of repeat 
test-takers) retest issues that are yet poorly understood.  
 Therefore, this study proposes a framework for addressing questions about retesting 
in operational selection settings that outlines the different retest effects, their conceptual 
meanings and practical implications, and the statistical tests that can be used. Next, we use 
the framework to develop hypotheses regarding the impact of retaking exemplars of three 
types of tests (a knowledge test, a cognitive ability test, and a situational judgment test, 
SJT). Finally, we apply the framework to examine retesting in an operational selection 
context, namely the admission to medical studies in Belgium. 
A Framework for Retesting in Operational Selection Settings  
 Retest effects can be defined as test score changes after prior exposure to an 
identical test or to an alternate form of this test under standardized conditions. Using this 
definition, retest effects encompass both practice and coaching effects (Kulik, Bangert-
Drowns, & Kulik, 1984; Messick & Jungeblut, 1981; Sackett, Burris, & Ryan, 1989). Table 1 
presents our framework of retesting in operational selection settings. A central feature is the 
distinction between within-person and between-person effects. 
Within-person Retest Effects 
 Within-person retest effects refer to effects associated with the same group of 
individuals who retake an identical test or an alternate form of the test. In selection practice, 
an examination of retest effects is typically equated with investigating whether multiple 
administrations of a test improve individuals’ mean test performance (see Campbell, 2004; 
McElreath et al., 2004). To examine whether there is a significant difference between test 
means of the same individuals across two examinations, organizations typically use a paired 
samples t-test or compute an effect size of mean differences (Cohen’s d).  
 Tests of mean score changes across the same individuals have practical relevance 
for organizations and for individuals. Organizations might compare the size of the observed 
retest effects to findings in test manuals or in the extant literature. Next, decisions to switch 
to other tests might be informed by information about retest effects. Findings about retest 
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effects also have implications for candidates’ assessment of the prospects for change should 
they decide to retest. In fact, it informs them about their chances to be rank ordered among 
those selected on the second administration. 
 Besides comparing mean test scores across administrations, organizations might 
also examine the more fundamental issue as to whether retaking a test affects the 
relationship of the test with the criterion (i.e., the validity of the test). To this end, one might 
compare the correlation between individuals’ original test score and the criterion with the 
correlation between individuals’ repeat test score and the criterion, using Meng, Rosenthal, 
and Rubin’s (1992) Z test for the difference between dependent correlations. 
 As mentioned in Table 1, results of possible changes in test-criterion validities due to 
retesting have important implications for operational selection practice. First, retesting is 
commonly done on the assumption that the most recent score will be the more valid one. An 
examination of test-criterion validities might provide support for this common retesting policy. 
Second, researchers meta-analyzing the validity of tests might also have multiple scores of 
the same candidates on the same test available. Third, it is important for candidates to know 
which of their test scores provides the most accurate assessment of their knowledge, skills, 
and abilities (KSAs). 
Between-person Retest Effects 
 In operational selection settings, applicant pools are typically a mixture of first-time 
test-takers and repeat test-takers. This common selection situation opens various between-
person issues for organizations that have been largely ignored. A first issue is whether one-
time test-takers score better than repeat test-takers. Organizations can examine this issue 
by conducting an independent samples t-test and/or computing an effect size measure. 
However, such an examination is not informative because the result is uninterpretable. The 
key point is that the comparison of one-time and repeat test-takers is heavily influenced by 
the proportion passing the test, and is likely affected by organizational feedback policies. For 
example, consider the following scenarios. Repeat test-takers are likely to produce mean 
scores far lower than one-time test-takers in a scenario with a high passing rate: if 90% 
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pass, then repeat test-takers come from the bottom 10% of the distribution. Conversely, 
repeat test-takers may be very similar to one-time test-takers when the passing rate is very 
low: if only 10% pass, then repeat test-takers are drawn from 90% of the full applicant pool. 
In short, the question of mean score differences between one-time and repeat test-takers is 
heavily influenced by situational factors, and the magnitude of the difference is not generally 
interpretable as an indicator of the degree to which test scores change upon retesting. 
 Second, similar to within-person comparisons, it is useful to compare the criterion-
related validity of scores produced by one-time test-takers with scores produced by repeat 
test-takers. Differences in validity would have implications for expected levels of validity in 
applied settings. For instance, a finding of a weaker predictor-criterion relationship among 
repeat test-takers would indicate that a lower level of validity would be expected in a 
validation sample including both one-time test-takers and repeat test-takers than in a sample 
made up solely of one-time test-takers.  
 As a third issue related to between-person effects, it is useful to examine whether the 
entry gaining score for the group of repeat test-takers predicts as well as the entry-gaining 
score for the group of one-time test-takers. In other words, does a given test score result in 
the same expected level of criterion performance regardless of whether it is an initial score 
or a retest score? We posit here that this question is conceptually similar to that asked in the 
domain of predictive bias by subgroup, and that it can be tested with the moderated multiple 
regression model that is widely used in that domain (Cleary, 1968; Lautenschlager & 
Mendoza, 1986; Sackett, Laczo, & Lippe, 2003). 
 Adapting this model to the retesting domain, consider a regression model relating 
test scores to a criterion. The scores represent the entry-gaining score for each test-taker. 
For some, the entry-gaining score is the initial attempt at taking the test; for others the entry-
gaining score is a retest. The inclusion of a dummy variable reflecting whether a test score is 
an initial attempt or a retest provides a test of intercept differences between the two groups 
(i.e., whether a given test score produces a systematically different level of criterion 
performance if it is an initial test than if it is a retest). Adding an interaction term (test score 
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multiplied by the dummy variable reflecting initial test vs. retest) provides a test of slope 
differences between initial and repeat test-takers. 
 The results of applying this model have implications for practice (see Table 1). In 
fact, the possibility that a repeat test score may signal a different level of performance than 
the same score by a one-time test-taker merits attention because decisions about selected 
applicants (e.g., placement into jobs, assignments to training programs, or promotions) may 
be based on predicted performance levels.  
Development of Hypotheses 
 In this section, we use our framework to develop hypotheses for the effects of 
retaking three exemplars of tests, namely cognitive ability tests, knowledge tests, and SJTs. 
Cognitive ability and knowledge tests are widely used for employment decisions and 
educational admissions due to their validity for predicting job and academic performance 
(Kuncel, Hezlett, & Ones, 2001; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). A focus on SJTs is relevant given 
the recent interest to use these tests as supplements to cognitive tests in employment 
(McDaniel, Morgeson, Finnegan, Campion, & Braverman, 2001) and educational settings 
(Lievens, Buyse, & Sackett, 2005; Oswald, Schmitt, Kim, Ramsay, & Gillespie, 2004).  
Within-person Retest Effects 
 As noted earlier, extensive research evidence has accumulated with regard to the 
effects of repeat administrations of cognitive ability tests (Burke, 1997; DerSimonian & Laird, 
1983; Kulik et al., 1984; Messick & Jungeblut, 1981; Powers, 1986; Powers & Rock, 1999). 
Kulik, Kulik et al. (1984), for instance, conducted a meta-analysis of practice effects related 
to cognitive ability. The average effect size was .42 (for identical tests) and .23 (for parallel 
tests). Another meta-analysis (Kulik, Banger-Drowns et al., 1984) revealed that coaching 
raised cognitive ability scores by about .40. Recent studies (Becker, 1990; Briggs, 2001; 
Hausknecht, Trevor, & Farr, 2002; Jensen, 1998; Powers & Rock, 1999) confirmed these 
increases in cognitive ability scores across repeat examinations due to practice or coaching. 
 We develop here the implications of four possible outcomes when an individual 
retests (see Table 2). We make two simplifying assumptions. We focus on scenarios where 
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an individual’s true score either remains constant or increases upon retesting, which we 
believe typifies high stakes testing. We also focus on situations where test administration is 
standardized. Although retest effects are certainly likely if test conditions (e.g., time limits) 
are unstandardized, such lack of standardization is a violation of sound testing practices. 
 As shown in Table 2, the first possible outcome is that observed score change may 
simply be due to measurement error, resulting in either a higher or a lower observed score 
upon retesting. Second, increases in test scores might reflect a genuine improvement of the 
person’s standing on the characteristic. According to this explanation, candidates are 
actually able to improve their KSAs due to learning or experience, resulting in higher test 
scores on the second administration. Third, there might be a criterion-relevant change in the 
observed score that reduces or eliminates a deficit between the observed score and an 
unchanging true score. For instance, test unfamiliarity resulted in an observed score lower 
than the true score on the first test, but this deficit was removed on the retest. Fourth, 
candidates’ higher test scores on the second administration might reflect artificial 
improvement on the characteristic of interest, resulting from the learning of tricks, recall of 
repeated items, improper access to test content, or any other non-random source of 
criterion-irrelevant score improvement. Note that these scenarios are not mutually exclusive, 
and a sample of test-takers is likely to include individuals falling into most, if not all of these 
categories. Although these four explanations reflect different perspectives, all but 
measurement error lead to the expectation that test scores will increase upon retesting, 
which leads to Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 1: On average, retaking a test will lead to an increase in test scores.  
 In operational selection situations, it is typically not possible to distinguish between 
these explanations. However, it is useful to explore the plausibility of the explanations across 
various tests. Generally, the deficit reduction explanation (the criterion-relevant change) 
seems to be operating regardless of the type of test. The genuine improvement explanation 
seems particularly relevant for knowledge tests. Since knowledge tests are so specialized in 
terms of knowledge, it can be expected that knowledge tests are more susceptible to 
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learning (either from own study or external interventions). The reverse seems to be the case 
for cognitive ability tests. Along these lines, Anastasi and Urbina (1997) place cognitive 
ability tests at one end of the continuum as they typically have a broad content and measure 
general cognitive processes that are more difficult to improve in a short amount of time. 
Conversely, knowledge tests are situated at the other end of the continuum as their content 
is specialized by a specific subject-matter field (Messick & Jungeblut, 1981). This leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a: Within-person retest effects will be larger for knowledge tests than for 
cognitive ability tests. 
 We also hypothesize that the magnitude of retest effects will be different for cognitive 
ability tests versus SJTs. An SJT is typically seen as a method that can be used to measure 
various constructs (both cognitive and non-cognitive) (Chan & Schmitt, 1997; McDaniel et 
al., 2001). Some researchers have argued that the extent to which people are able to 
improve their scores on an SJT is a function of the constructs measured by the SJT (Peeters 
& Lievens, 2005). Specifically, score increases (either due to practice, coaching, or faking) 
should be less likely for SJTs which correlate heavily with cognitive ability. Conversely, 
people might be better able to improve their performance on SJTs when the SJTs do not 
show substantive correlations with cognitive ability. In this study, the SJT under investigation 
is an interpersonally-oriented SJT which does not correlate heavily with cognitively-oriented 
predictors. To gauge the potential retest effects associated with this SJT, prior research on 
retest effects on other noncognitive predictors (e.g., personality tests) might be insightful. 
Unfortunately, we found only one study about the effects of retaking personality tests (Kelley, 
Jacobs, & Farr, 1994). This study revealed small but significant changes in personality test 
scores. On the basis of these empirical results and the conceptual arguments presented 
above, we offer the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2b: Within-person retest effects will be larger for interpersonally-oriented 
SJTs than for cognitive ability tests. 
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 A key issue with within-person retest effects is whether retesting affects criterion-
related validity (i.e., whether a given person’s initial test or a retest is more valid). In Table 2, 
we outline the expected effects on validity of the four mechanisms for change in observed 
score developed above. Again, we expect that the effects of retaking a test on the 
relationship of the test with the criterion will differ according to the type of test considered. 
Specifically, we expect that retest scores will provide a more valid assessment of a person’s 
standing on the construct of interest for knowledge tests because it can be expected that 
people can genuinely improve on knowledge tests. In other words, we hypothesize that 
increases on knowledge test scores will also yield higher levels of criterion performance. 
Conversely, for the other two tests (cognitive ability tests and SJTs) we expect that the retest 
score will differ from the initial score due to one of two mechanisms: artificial change due to 
gimmicks and tricks that is unrelated to the criterion of interest (which would result in lower 
validity for the retest), or change due to reduction of a deficit (unfamiliarity with the test, etc.). 
The latter would result in higher validity for the retest, as the retest would be a better 
indicator of the true score. Thus, for cognitive ability tests and SJTs we see competing 
mechanisms which would drive validity in opposite directions. Absent knowledge about the 
prevalence of these mechanisms, we will hypothesize that these opposing mechanisms 
cancel one another out. This leads to the following set of hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a: The relationship between knowledge test scores and the relevant 
criterion (GPA) will be higher for people’s retest scores as compared to their initial 
test scores. 
Hypothesis 3b: Retesting will not affect the relationship between cognitive ability test 
scores and a conceptually related criterion (i.e., GPA). 
Hypothesis 3c: Retesting will not affect the relationship between SJT scores and a 
conceptually related criterion (i.e., interpersonal GPA). 
Between-person Retest Effects 
 Between-person retest effects involve a comparison between test scores of people 
who take the test only once and people who take the test twice or more. As mentioned 
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above, it is not informative to compare mean score changes between one-time and repeat 
test-takers. Therefore, we focus on between-person effects on validity. In terms of the 
criterion-related validity for one-time versus repeat test-takers, Table 2 outlines the expected 
results for each of the four mechanisms resulting in score change upon retest. Three of the 
four mechanisms would not affect validity in the retest group, relative to the one-time test-
takers. Only if one is confident that there are no individuals in the fourth category (i.e., no 
individuals improved their scores due to nonrandom criterion-irrelevant factors) would one 
expect equal validity for one-time test-takers and repeat test-takers. Our expectation is that 
even on tests where some individuals can reasonably be expected to improve their true 
score through study (e.g., knowledge tests), some score change may be artifactual, and thus 
we expect lower validity among repeat test-takers for all tests. 
Hypothesis 4: The validity of knowledge tests, cognitive ability tests, and SJTs will be 
lower among repeat test-takers than among one-time test-takers. 
In addition, a differential prediction model might be used as a formal and more 
detailed test of whether a test score has different performance implications if it is an initial 
test or a retest. Without offering specific hypotheses, we view the use of the differential 
prediction framework as a diagnostic device that sheds light on the nature of retest effects. 
Specifically, a finding of identical regression lines for one-time test-takers and repeat test-
takers would indicate that individuals’ change in scores upon retesting reflects solely true 
change in the construct of interest, and that the fact a test-taker required a second attempt to 
obtain a particular score is of no consequence in predicting the test-taker’s subsequent 
performance. In contrast, a finding that retest scores overpredict subsequent performance 
would result if changes in scores upon retesting do not reflect true changes in the construct 
of interest, but rather reflect mechanisms such as familiarity with test items or test-wiseness. 
A finding that retest scores overpredict subsequent performance would also result if the fact 
that an individual required a second attempt to obtain a passing score signals something 
about the test-taker above and beyond the test-taker’s standing on the construct measured 
by the test. For example, the initial failure may represent a lack of diligence in preparing for 
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the initial test. If this lack of diligence is habitual, it may similarly affect subsequent 
performance. Regardless of the mechanism, though, a finding that retest scores overpredict 
performance would argue against using a common regression line for predicting the 
performance of one-time versus repeat test-takers.  
Method 
Sample and Procedure 
 Data were collected during the admission exams for medical studies administered 
between 2000 and 2003 in Belgium. Within this time span, 8 examinations took place and 
5025 students (1817 men and 3208 women, average age = 18.10 yrs.) completed the test 
battery. Figure 1 gives an overview of the flow of these applicants through the selection 
process. As shown in Figure 1, 1498 individuals passed the exam on their first attempt, 
whereas 3527 individuals failed to pass the exam. Among this group, there were 1985 
individuals who retook the test battery. 
 Each year, the admission exam lasted for a whole day and was centrally 
administered in a large hall. On average, the passing rate of the admission exam was about 
30%. A week after the exam, candidates obtained feedback on their test scores. Candidates 
who did not pass could retake the test battery. Two examinations were scheduled per year. 
Predictor Measures 
 Since 2000, the admission exam consisted of the following tests1: a science 
knowledge test, a cognitive ability test, and an SJT. Alternate forms were developed for each 
examination. Once alternate forms were developed, the form used in a specific 
administration was randomly determined.  
 Science knowledge test. This test measured four science-related subjects (chemistry, 
physics, mathematics, and biology) and consisted of 40 questions (10 questions per subject) 
with four alternatives. To develop alternate forms of this test, the factorial domain-sampling 
procedure was used (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). This meant that, for inclusion in the 
alternate test, the same group of SMEs always chose 10 questions within each of the four 
content areas from a larger item bank with content similar to that on the original test. The 
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items in this bank had known item properties so that the average item difficulty was held 
constant across alternate forms. 
 Cognitive ability test. This test consisted of 50 items with five response alternatives. 
The items were formulated in either verbal, numeric, or figural terms. Prior research 
documented the reliability (.84) and predictive validity (.36) of this test in a medical student 
population (Minnaert, 1996). To develop alternate forms of the cognitive ability test, items 
were selected from a larger existing bank of items whose psychometric properties were 
known (i.e., the general domain-sampling of Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). Hence, it was 
possible to hold the average item difficulty constant across alternate forms. 
 SJT. This test consisted of short videotaped vignettes of key interpersonal situations 
that physicians are likely to encounter with patients. After each videotaped vignette, the 
scene froze and the candidate medical students were required to choose the most effective 
response. The original version of the SJT consisted of 30 questions of the multiple-choice 
type, with four response alternatives. The general aim of the SJT was to measure skills other 
than cognitive ability (i.e., interpersonal and communication skills). To develop alternate 
forms of a multidimensional test such as an SJT, we used a variant of the item-cloning 
procedure of Clause, Mullins, Nee, Pulakos, and Schmitt (1998). This item-cloning 
procedure maximized the degree of similarity between original and parallel test items by 
constructing similar items in terms of content, grammatical structure, and option structure. In 
each examination, we built the same interpersonal incidents (e.g., handling complaints of a 
patient, conveying bad news) into the SJT. In addition, we tried as much as possible to 
include variants (‘clones’) of the original item stems and response alternatives in the 
alternate forms. However, to preserve the security of the SJT, incidents were embedded in 
different contexts across years. For example, in one year a specific incident was built around 
a lower back pain problem, whereas in another year the same incident was woven into a 
headache complaint. Each year, 10 SMEs (experienced physicians, professors in general 
medicine) completed the alternate set of items and their responses were compared to the 
responses to the original items. In some cases, it was necessary to change/remove the 
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parallel items/response options and insert new ones. Across years, an average of 70 percent 
of the items was judged to be parallel. 
 We also conducted various additional analyses to investigate the reliability and 
construct validity of the alternate SJT forms. These analyses were conducted on the basis of 
the data of the alternate forms of the SJT included in this study. First, the correlations of 
each of the alternate forms of the SJT with the other admission exam tests revealed a 
consistent picture. The alternate SJT forms typically showed low correlations with the 
science tests (rs around .10). The correlation between the alternate SJT forms and the 
cognitive ability test was consistently around .15. Second, factor analyses (principal 
components with varimax rotation) per SJT alternate form yielded a consistent picture as 13 
or 14 factors (with eigenvalues greater than 1) were typically extracted, explaining about 
55% of the variance. Third, the internal consistencies of the alternate SJT forms did not differ 
markedly (ranging between .30 and .40). These low internal consistency coefficients of the 
SJT forms are not unexpected given the multidimensional nature of SJTs (Chan & Schmitt, 
1997; Clause et al., 1998). As it has been argued that test-retest or alternate form reliability 
is a better reliability index for SJTs, we conducted an additional study among 250 
introductory psychology students. These students completed two randomly chosen SJTs 
that had been developed for the admission exams included in this study, with a one week 
interval. The correlation between the two SJT scores was .66. This value is consistent with 
the values obtained in Clause et al. (1998) (ranging between .70 and .77) given that the two 
sets of SJT items were presented at the same time in that study. 
 Although we tried to maximize the parallelism among the test forms across 
examinations, other psychometric interventions were not possible. First, no relevant pilot 
sample was available so that we could neither test nor calibrate the items a priori. As this 
central admission exam determined entry to medical studies in all Belgian universities, all 
Belgian high-school seniors were potential candidates. Second, it was forbidden by law to 
administer items that would not be used to compute the total test score. Thus, we could not 
insert a group of pilot items into the actual tests. It was also forbidden by law to a posteriori 
Retest effects 15
weight and/or discard items. Given these situational and legal constraints it is still possible 
that any single test form may be different (e.g., slightly more or less difficult, more or less 
reliable) than other forms. Our solution to this potential problem is to limit our examination to 
comparisons between candidate’s first and second testing attempts. Since there were 8 
examination opportunities over the 4-year period, our comparison of first and second testing 
attempts pools data across 8 different alternate forms. Thus, a first attempt vs. second 
attempt comparison incorporates data from form 1 vs. form 2 comparisons, form 2 vs. form 3 
comparisons, 3 vs. 4, 4 vs. 5, etc. In addition, a given test form may constitute the first test 
attempt for one group of candidates and the second test attempt for another group of 
candidates. Potential difficulty or reliability differences across forms should average out 
using this procedure, resulting in no systematic test differences between what we label “first 
attempt” and “second attempt”. 
Criterion Measures 
 Two criterion measures were used. First, we retrieved archival data on students’ 
grade point average (GPA) from all Belgian universities. GPA can be considered to be a 
more cognitively-oriented criterion because it mainly consists of students’ grades on science-
related and medical-related subjects. Given differences across universities, we standardized 
students’ GPA within university and within academic year. Where possible, we gathered 
students’ GPA for several academic years because the average GPA across several years 
provides a more reliable estimate of students’ GPA. To estimate the reliability of our 
criterion, we correlated GPA across years. These correlations exceeded .70, which is similar 
to the values found in a meta-analysis on the temporal stability of GPA (Vey et al., 2003).  
 As a second criterion measure, we retrieved archival data on students’ scores on 
interpersonally-oriented courses from all Belgian universities. These criterion data were 
gathered because they are useful for validating an SJT that aims to measure interpersonal 
and communication skills. A composite score was obtained by averaging scores on 
interpersonal courses. Given that interpersonal courses were not included in the curriculum 
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of some universities, this interpersonal GPA criterion was based on a smaller N than GPA 
was. This composite correlated .41 with GPA. 
Results 
Overall Results 
 Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on the total sample of candidates (N = 5025) 
who took the tests from 2000 until 2003. Given that candidates were selected on the basis of 
a third variable (i.e., on the basis of a cut-off score determined on an operational composite 
which was a weighted sum of each of the tests used), indirect range restriction (Thorndike’s 
case 3) occurred. As indirect range restriction is a special case of multivariate range 
restriction, all correlations were corrected using the multivariate range restriction formulas of 
Ree, Carretta, Earles, and Albert (1994). Statistical significance was determined prior to 
correcting the correlations (Sackett & Yang, 2000). 
 As shown in Table 3, knowledge and cognitive ability tests were valid predictors of 
GPA (corrected r = .47 and r = .16, respectively)2, confirming meta-analytic findings in 
educational settings (Kuncel et al., 2001). The SJT was the only valid predictor of the 
interpersonal composite (corrected r = .19) (see Lievens et al., 2005). Generally, these 
results are in line with what is found in the broad selection literature. 
Examination of Within-person Retest Effects 
 We started by examining the within-person part of our retesting framework. In these 
within-person analyses, the individuals tested remained the same, whereas the tests used 
were alternate forms of the same test. As outlined in Table 1, we examined within-person 
change in mean scores by computing d values. These d values were obtained by subtracting 
the score on the second examination by the score on the first examination, divided by the 
total group standard deviation. Positive effect sizes mean that the second examination score 
was higher than the first one. The sample for these analyses consisted of the 1985 repeat 
test-takers. Results for this group are presented in the last four columns of Table 4.  
 Hypothesis 1 stated that retaking tests would lead to higher scores on all tests. As 
can be seen in Table 4, all effect sizes were positive as the mean score on the second 
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examination was always higher than the mean score on the first examination. The effect size 
associated with the operational composite equaled .37. These results support Hypothesis 1. 
 Our second set of hypotheses dealt with mean score changes on the specific tests. 
Specifically, we hypothesized that the effect size for cognitive ability tests would be smaller 
than the effect sizes for knowledge tests and SJTs. Table 4 shows that the effect sizes 
equaled .42 for cognitive ability and .27 for the knowledge test. The SJT had an effect size of 
.32. When effect sizes for different tests are compared, it is important to take account of the 
unreliability of the predictor. As noted by Schmitt, Clause, and Pulakos (1996), this issue 
might be especially relevant for multidimensional predictors such as an SJT because the 
effect size associated with an SJT might be attenuated due to its lower reliability. Therefore, 
we corrected all effect sizes for unreliability in the predictor. In particular, for the knowledge 
and cognitive ability tests, a test-retest reliability value of .84 was used on the basis of prior 
research. For the SJT, a test-retest reliability value of .66 was used (see the reliability study 
described above). The last column of Table 4 reports d values corrected for unreliability in 
the tests. After correcting for unreliability, the effect sizes associated with the knowledge test 
and SJT were .30 and .40, respectively. The effect size associated with the cognitive ability 
test was .46. These results do not support our second set of hypotheses.  
 The third hypothesis stated that the relationship between knowledge test scores and 
GPA would be higher for people’s retest scores than for their initial test scores. We also 
hypothesized that retesting would not affect the test-criterion relationship for cognitive ability 
tests and for SJTs. We computed two sets of validity coefficients for the group of repeat test-
takers, one using the initial test and one using the retest. These correlations were corrected 
for multivariate range restriction and for unreliability in the predictor so that our results would 
not be confounded by differences in reliability across the tests. Statistical significance was 
determined prior to correcting the correlations.  
 As shown in Table 5, the validity coefficients of the knowledge test in predicting GPA 
differed depending on whether the test score was based on test-takers’ first or second time 
taking the test. Specifically, the second knowledge test score (r = .21, corrected r = .37, N = 
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556) was more valid than the first one (r = .11, corrected r = .23, N = 556). According to the 
Z test of Meng et al. (1992), this difference was statistically significant, Z = -2.24 (p <.05). 
For the cognitive ability test, there was no significant difference in terms of validity 
coefficients for predicting GPA. The SJT validity coefficients in predicting interpersonal GPA 
were also not significantly different depending on whether students’ initial test scores or 
retest scores were used as predictors. These results support Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c. 
Examination of Between-person Retest Effects 
 Contrary to the previous analyses, between-person analyses use test scores of two 
different groups of individuals: test scores of one-time test-takers (second column of Table 4, 
N = 1237) and entry-gaining scores of repeat test-takers (sixth column of Table 4, N = 1985 
from which 556 passed the exam). To test Hypothesis 4, we used the differential validity 
model and computed the validity of each test broken down by test-takers (one-time vs. 
repeat). Again, the appropriate corrections were applied to the correlations. The validity of 
the cognitive ability test was significantly (p < .05) higher for the group of one-time test-
takers (uncorrected r = -.04, corrected r = .28, N = 1237) than for the group of repeat test-
takers (uncorrected r = -.14, corrected r = -.03, N = 556). The difference between the validity 
of the knowledge test for one-time (uncorrected r = .25, corrected r = .54, N = 1237) vs. 
repeat test-takers (uncorrected r = .21, corrected r = .37, N = 556) was not significant. Note 
though, that while the correlations do not differ when significance testing is done on 
uncorrected correlations, the lack of difference appears to be an artifact of differential range 
restriction. After range restriction correction, the validity for one-time test takers is markedly 
higher (.54 vs. .37). There was no significant difference between the SJT validity coefficients 
(uncorrected r = .15, corrected r = .20, N = 348; uncorrected r = .23, corrected r = .28, N = 
140) for predicting interpersonal GPA. These results partially support Hypothesis 4. 
 We also examined between-person retest effects by conducting a moderated multiple 
regression with the entry-gaining total score (the operational composite) for each individual 
as predictor, a dummy variable reflecting initial vs. retest status, and an interaction term 
between the two. We were not able to run a moderated regression analysis with each test as 
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predictor because otherwise we would suffer from the omitted variables problem3 in 
regression analysis (Sackett et al., 2003). We focused only on GPA as dependent variable 
because the total composite score aims to predict GPA (and not interpersonal GPA).  
 Table 6 presents the results of the moderated regression analysis. As can be seen, 
there was a significant effect for the retest dummy in predicting GPA. This finding of an 
intercept difference in the context of retesting indicates that the prediction on the basis of the 
operational composite could be enhanced by including retest status. In other words, a total 
test score of a repeat test-taker did not have the same expected performance consequences 
as the same total test score obtained by a one-time test-taker. In particular, a mean 
regression line would underpredict the total score for one-time test-takers and overpredict 
the total score of repeat test-takers. There was also a significant interaction effect between 
the retest status dummy and the operational composite in predicting GPA. However, given 
that the R2 increment was only .004, we view this as too small to be of practical significance.  
Discussion 
 Retest effects have been mostly studied in controlled research settings. However, the 
prevalence of retesting in operational selection necessitates that we also understand in what 
way retest effects might compromise measurement accuracy in field settings. Along these 
lines, this study has both conceptual and empirical contributions. The remainder discusses 
these contributions together with implications and limitations of our findings. 
Conceptual Contributions  
 In this study, we developed a comprehensive framework for examining retest effects 
in operational selection settings. Several features make this framework valuable. First, our 
framework distinguishes within-person and between-person retest effects. This is an 
important conceptual contribution because extant retesting research has mainly focused on 
within-person mean score changes. Yet, in most practical selection situations, people who 
do well the first time do not retake the test, but they are compared with people who did, 
making between-person retest issues equally important. 
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 Second, we outlined the various underlying reasons for observed score changes 
upon retesting (see the four categories in Table 2) and delineated their hypothesized effects 
on validity (both in within-person and between-person analyses). Gathering information 
about mean score changes in combination with validity changes enables researchers and 
practitioners to more forcefully disentangle the reasons behind retest effects. For instance, 
suppose a mean score change observed for a specific test is accompanied by lower validity 
of the retest (as compared to the initial test) and by lower validity for repeat test-takers as 
compared to one-time test-takers. In this specific case, Table 2 shows that retest effects 
probably occurred due to criterion-irrelevant variance (e.g., tricks or gimmicks).  
 Finally, our framework outlines which specific analytical strategies might be used to 
examine the various retest effects. Specifically, it emphasizes examining between-person 
retest effects through the differential validity and differential prediction approaches. 
Application of differential prediction is a useful diagnostic technique for investigating whether 
a given score is linked to the same level of expected criterion performance regardless of 
whether it is an initial score or a retest score. Thus, this approach further helps to distinguish 
between true and artifactual score change. 
 In short, our framework opens a window of opportunity for more systematically and 
conclusively investigating retest issues in field settings. We believe its application is not 
bound to an educational context (cf. this study), but is equally useful in both private and 
public sector selection. 
Empirical Contributions 
 This study contributes to the retesting literature by examining retest effects for 
exemplars of three tests in terms of mean score and validity changes. Regarding mean 
score changes, significant retest effects were found for all tests, with effect sizes varying 
between about one third and one half of a standard deviation. The effect size found for 
cognitive ability in this study is in line with previous lab and field studies (Hausknecht et al., 
2002; Kulik et al., 1984). Conversely, the retest effects for knowledge tests and for a new 
test format, the SJT, are smaller than hypothesized. Especially, the small retest effect for the 
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knowledge test (as compared to the one found for the cognitive ability test) seems 
surprising. An explanation might be that the magnitude of a retest effect on a knowledge test 
is a function of the breadth of the knowledge domain. If the domain is one subtopic within 
biology (e.g., photosynthesis), it is easier to change one’s true score than if the domain is the 
whole of biology. And changing one’s true score in biology is easier than changing one’s true 
score on science in general, including biology, physics, chemistry, etc. In our study, the 
science domain is very broad. While the change observed is likely to be true change (e.g., 
new knowledge), if the test is intended to tap knowledge that is acquired by most test-takers 
through many years of intense study, it seems reasonable that the change resulting from 
studying for a number of months prior to a retest would be modest. Future studies are 
needed to better understand the moderating role of domain breadth in explaining retest 
effects for knowledge tests. 
 Another contribution to the extant retesting literature is that our analytical approaches 
enabled us to start examining why retest effects occurred. For cognitive ability tests, we 
found that validity was significantly lower for repeat test-takers as compared to one-time test-
takers. In addition, our study revealed that the validity of initial cognitive ability test scores of 
repeat test-takers was lower (albeit not significantly) than the validity of their retest scores. 
According to the categories listed in Table 2, the combination of these two pieces of validity 
evidence suggests that the observed score change on cognitive ability tests is probably 
mainly due to criterion-irrelevant variance (category 4). For knowledge tests, our study found 
that their validity was not significantly different for one-time test-takers as compared to 
repeat test-takers. Further, initial knowledge test scores of repeat test-takers were 
significantly higher than their retest scores. As shown by Table 2, this combination of validity 
evidence seems to suggest that genuine improvement (category 2) and/or deficit reduction 
(category 3) are mainly responsible for the effects. A similar conclusion might be gleaned for 
SJTs because the validity of SJTs was equal for one-time and repeat test-takers, whereas 
initial SJT scores of repeat-test-takers were lower (albeit not significant) than their retest 
scores. Although the above provides an explanation for the retest effects for each of the 
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three tests, an important caveat is in order. A sample of repeat test-takers is likely to include 
individuals falling into all of the four categories of Table 2. For some test-takers other 
explanations might be tenable. Hence, the aforementioned explanations apply to the repeat 
test-taker group as a whole. 
 Some might argue that the results of the within-person and between-person retest 
effects on validity are contradictory because some within-person results show that scores of 
repeat test-takers have higher validity, whereas some between-person results reveal that 
scores of one-time test-takers lead to higher validity. Yet, there is nothing paradoxical in 
these results. Basically, our results show that in these data validity is typically highest when 
only one-time test-takers are included. This means that validity obtained on a sample of one-
time test-takers is higher than validity obtained on the basis of either the first or second test 
score of repeat test-takers. Next, among repeat test-takers, a validity coefficient obtained on 
the basis of a repeat score (on knowledge tests) is higher than a validity coefficient obtained 
on the basis of an initial score on these tests.  
 A last important conclusion is that a given test score has different performance 
implications for one-time test-takers than for repeat test-takers. Results from our differential 
prediction analysis showed that the performance implications were different for one-time 
test-takers than for repeat test-takers. On the basis of these results we recommend that 
more attention be paid to test-taking status when computing validity coefficients in primary 
and secondary (meta-analytic) studies. 
Limitations 
 First, this study was conducted in an operational setting. Hence, there is less control 
than in experimental settings. Specifically, we neither had control over nor had information 
about the nature or extent of test preparation activities (e.g., study, practice, coaching) 
intervening between first and second administration of the examination. Therefore, we 
concentrated on the broader phenomenon of retest effects. Future laboratory studies are 
needed to disentangle these different effects.  
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 A second possible limitation is that this study was conducted in an educational 
context in Belgium. There are some differences between admission practices in Belgium and 
the U.S. For example, in Belgium the admission process is centralized and the level of 
selectivity (30% passing rate) is less stringent than in the U.S. Yet, there are also many 
similarities in admission practices between Belgium and the U.S. For example, in both 
countries it has been suggested to supplement cognitive predictors with SJTs (Oswald et al., 
2004; Lievens et al., 2005). Hence, we believe that our results might generalize to high 
stakes testing in other countries such as the U.S. In addition, our results might be relevant 
for high stakes employment testing in the public sector (e.g., selection of firefighters, law 
enforcement jobs) as the retesting policies for those jobs share many parallels with retesting 
policies in high stakes educational testing. In any case, future studies are needed to 
examine the generalizability of our results in other settings and countries. 
 Third, GPA served as the criterion in this study. Therefore, future research should 
examine whether our results generalize to employment settings with job performance as the 
criterion. It is worth noting, however, that much validation work in employment settings is 
against training criteria. Also, while there are certainly differences between work settings and 
education settings, note that the context where we find the SJT useful is in the less 
academic settings, namely interpersonal courses. It can be argued that activities in such 
courses are more similar to "work" than are courses in the sciences. In addition, grades on 
interpersonal courses are often not based on regular exams but on practical exercises.  
Implications for Retesting Practice  
 Applicants typically retake tests to obtain higher scores. In turn, this would increase 
their probability of being selected. Our study provided only partial support for the premise 
that a retest score is more valid than an initial score. For cognitive ability tests and SJTs, it 
did not seem to matter which scores were used. Only for knowledge tests, the score related 
to the most recent (i.e., second) examination seems to be preferred as this score had 
significantly higher validities. In additional analyses, we also examined whether using the 
average of the scores on the first and the second examination increased the validity of the 
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knowledge test as this average score might be more reliable. The uncorrected validity of the 
average knowledge test score was .18 (as compared to .21 for the most recent knowledge 
test score). 
Implications for Future Research 
 As mentioned above, there exists a paucity of research on retesting in operational 
selection situations. This lack of research contrasts with the widespread use of retesting in 
practice. Therefore, future research is needed to test the viability of current retesting policies 
in organizations. This study provided research-based evidence for one key assumption 
underlying retesting in organizations (i.e., should the most recent score be used when 
multiple scores on the same test are available?). Other retesting issues deal with the time 
lag between initial and repeat test administrations or with the maximum number of retests. 
Organizations typically follow best practices to determine such retesting policies. There is a 
critical need for more research-based evidence to support them.  
 As a second avenue for future research, it is important to understand which 
applicants decide to retake the tests. As shown in Table 4, about 1542 people did not retake 
the tests, whereas 1985 retook the tests. It would be worthwhile to examine which 
demographic, motivational, and test score differences exist between the group who decides 
to give up and the group who decides to retake the tests. Table 4 suggests that people who 
did not retake the tests scored especially low on the knowledge test. Clearly, future research 
is needed along these lines. To this end, one could draw on research on applicant 
withdrawal in multistage selection (Ryan, Sacco, McFarland, & Kriska, 2000).  
 Third, our framework might be extended by including changes in adverse impact as 
another dependent variable apart from mean score and test-criterion changes (Campbell, 
2004). If subgroup differences on a test exist, policies that permit retests by candidates who 
were unsuccessful on the test might inflate calculations of adverse impact.  
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Footnotes 
 1 Given test security concerns we cannot mention which specific tests were used. 
Besides these three tests, the Admission exam also consisted of 30 questions about a 10-
page written medical text (similar to an article in a popular medical journal). As each year a 
different text was used and different questions were developed, the texts used across 
examinations cannot be considered alternate forms and were not included in this study. 
 2 The negative observed correlation between cognitive ability and GPA (-.07) is due 
to the specific form of indirect range restriction occurring here. Candidates were selected on 
a composite including among others the cognitive and knowledge tests. As noted by Dawes 
(1971), this selection on a composite leads to the situation that the only way someone with a 
low cognitive test score can obtain a high enough composite score to be selected is to have 
a very high knowledge test score (and vice versa). Hence, what is in reality a positive 
correlation between the cognitive test and GPA (corrected r = .16) becomes a very different 
value (r = -.07) in the restricted sample.  
 3 For instance, imagine that a composite of two valid tests is used for selection. If the 
retest effects on one of the tests were examined using our moderated regression framework, 
the retest dummy would be correlated with the other test (as the composite score of the two 
tests determines whether a retest is needed). The dummy would serve as a proxy for the 
other test, and thus a significant effect for the dummy would reflect the other test’s validity in 
predicting performance. When screening is done on multiple tests, the solution is to include 
either all tests or the operational composite. The latter was done here.  
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Framework of Retesting and their Effects on Within-Person and Between-Person Decisions. 
 Within-person effects 
 
 Between-person effects 
 Test Means Test-criterion Relationships  Test Means Test-criterion Relationships 
Statistical 
Test 
- Paired samples t-test 
- Effect size measure 
 
Z test (Meng et al., 1992) of 
dependent overlapping 
correlations  
 - Independent samples t-test 
- Effect size measure 
 
- Differential validity model 
- Differential prediction model (tests 
of intercept and slope difference) 
Conceptual 
Meaning 
Does the candidate 
improve his/her score 
upon retesting? 
 
Which set of scores (initial, 
retest) is most related to the 
criterion of interest? 
 Do one-time test-takers score 
better than repeat test-
takers? 
- Are test-criterion relationships 
stronger for test scores of one-time 
vs. repeat test-takers (differential 
validity)? 
- Does a test score produce a 
systematically different level of 
criterion performance (common 
regression line versus separate 
regression lines) if it is an initial test 





- Candidates’ concerns to 
be rank ordered among 
those selected. 
- Magnitude of effect size 
signals to organizations 
whether change in test is 
needed. 
- Organizations’ concerns 
as to which candidate score 
is the more valid one. 
- Candidates’ concerns as 
to which of their scores 
provides the most accurate 
assessment of their KSAOs. 
 Not informative because the 
result is uninterpretable.  
 
 
- Organizations’ concerns as to 
whether a test score means the 
same for repeat vs. one-time test-
takers. 
- Primary and secondary 
researchers’ concerns to estimate 
test-criterion relationships (i.e., 




Overview of Reasons behind Observed Score Changes upon Retesting. 
Underlying reason Effect on validity (within-person effect) Effect on validity (between-person effect) 
1. Measurement error. Equal validity for initial test and retest. Equal validity for one-time and repeat test-
takers. 
 
2. True change in construct of interest. Higher validity for retest (except in the 
unexpected situation where true change is 
constant for all test-takers, in which validity is 
unchanged). 
 
Equal validity for one-time and repeat test-
takers. 
3. Criterion-relevant change (e.g., reduction 
of a deficit such as test unfamiliarity) in 
observed score. No true change in 
construct of interest. 
 
Higher validity for retest than for initial test. Equal validity for one-time and repeat test-
takers. 
4. Criterion-irrelevant change (e.g., tricks) 
in observed score. No true change in 
construct of interest. 
Lower validity for retest (except in the 
unexpected situation where change is constant 
for all test-takers, in which validity is 
unchanged). 





Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables in Total Sample. 
 M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
Predictors (N = 5025)        
1. Knowledge test (max = 40) 20.36 6.22 --     
2. Cognitive ability test (max = 50) 27.58 5.99 .43** --    
3. Situational judgment test (max = 30) 18.23 3.01 .10** .13** --   
4. Operational composite (max = 40) 20.63 4.76 .88** .67** .29** --  
Criteria        



















 *p < .05; **p < .01. Correlations between parentheses are corrected for multivariate range restriction. 
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Table 4 
Means and Standard Deviations of Test Scores for Different Test-taker Groups. 
 Total sample (N = 5025)   
 
Test-takers passing the exam  
at first attempt (N = 1498) 
 Test-takers not passing the exam  





(N = 1237) 
 Did not enter 
medical school 
(N = 261) 
 Test-takers 
who do not 
retest 








(N = 1985) 
  
Predictors M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD d d (corr) 
Knowledge test 27.01 4.24  26.45 4.07  16.33 4.52  18.56 4.50  20.24 5.46 .27 .30 
Cognitive ability test 31.71 4.77  31.85 4.76  25.41 5.79  26.13 5.39  28.67 5.42 .42 .46 
Situational judgment test 19.28 2.70  19.22 2.78  18.01 3.24  17.63 2.82  18.60 3.64 .32 .40 
Operational composite 26.36 2.35  26.15 2.16  17.35 3.29  18.89 3.01  20.67 4.32 .37 -- 
The d values are effect sizes computed by (M Second – M First) / (SD total group). Positive effect sizes mean that the second examination score was 
higher than the first one. The last column reports d values corrected for unreliability in the tests. In particular, for the knowledge and cognitive 
ability, a test-retest reliability value of .84 was used on the basis of prior research. For the SJT, a test-retest reliability value of .66 was used (see 
our description of the additional study we conducted). For the total composite, no correction was applied because we had no information on the 
reliability of this composite. 
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Table 5 
Summary of Within-person Retest Effects on Test-criterion Relationships. 
 
GPA Criterion  
(N = 556) 
 Interpersonal Criterion  











Knowledge test .11**  .21** -2.24*  .01  -.07 .80 
 (.21, .23)  (.34, .37)   (.03, .03)  (-.07, -.07)  
Cognitive ability test -.10*  -.14** .68  -.08  -.03 -.47 
 (.04, .04)  (-.03, -.03)   (-.04, -.04)  (-.03, -.04)  
Situational judgment test -.01  .03 -.57  .13  .23** -.91 
 (.01, .02)  (.08, .09)   (.13, .17)  (.23, .28)  
Operational Composite .10*  .23** -2.45*  .01  .00 .09 
 (.21, .21)  (.38, .38)   (.03, .03)  (.00, .00)  
Note. Correlations between parentheses are corrected correlations. The first correlation within parentheses was corrected for multivariate range 
restriction, whereas the second correlation within parentheses was corrected for multivariate range restriction and unreliability in the predictor. 
With regard to the latter, the same values as in Table 4 were used.  
a The Z test of Meng et al. (1992) was used to examine whether the difference between the two correlation coefficients was statistically 
significant. *p < .05; **p < .01.
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Table 6 
Summary of Moderated Regression Analysis for Examining Between-person Retest Effects on Test-criterion Relationships. 
 Beta t p R2 DR2 
Step 1      
Operational composite .44 6.42 .00 .08 .08** 
Step 2      
Dummy variable representing retest status -.09 -3.99 .00 .09 .01** 
Step 3      
Product term of operational composite and dummy variable 
representing retest status 
-.19 -2.70 .01 .09 .00** 
N = 1787 which consists of one-time test-takers who immediately passed the exam and entered medical school (N = 1237) 
and repeat test-takers who passed the exam at their second attempt and subsequently entered medical school (N = 556). 
*p < .05; **p < .01.  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Candidate flow through the selection process 
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